The Evolution of U.S. Extended Deterrence and South Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions

Author(s)
Se Young Jang
Abstract

Extended deterrence has been a main pillar of the security alliance between the United States and South Korea (Republic of Korea [ROK]) since the end of the Korean War. The changing dynamics of US extended deterrence in Korea, however, affected Seoul’s strategic choices within its bilateral alliance relationship with Washington. Examining the evolution of US extended deterrence in the Korean Peninsula until the Nixon administration, this article explains why South Korea began its nuclear weapons programme in a historical context of the US–ROK alliance relationship. This article argues that President Park Chung-hee’s increasing uncertainty about the US security commitment to South Korea in the 1960s led to his decision to develop nuclear weapons in the early 1970s despite the fact that US tactical nuclear weapons were still stationed in South Korea.

Organisation(s)
Department of History
Journal
Journal of Strategic Studies
Volume
39
Pages
502-520
No. of pages
19
ISSN
0140-2390
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2016.1168012
Publication date
04-2016
Peer reviewed
Yes
Austrian Fields of Science 2012
506017 Science and technology policy, 601008 Science of history, 506007 International relations, 601022 Contemporary history
Keywords
ASJC Scopus subject areas
Political Science and International Relations, Sociology and Political Science
Portal url
https://ucrisportal.univie.ac.at/en/publications/8a63dfbe-43e1-4c15-b53a-e2375307a96e